Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and
Federal Laws
Naomi Harlin Goodnoa
Introduction
The Internet is a powerful and wonderful tool that has brought on a new
information age. If it is purposely misused, however, it can be terrifying, and even
deadly. Imagine a distressed woman discovering the following messages on the Internet
that was falsely attributed to her:
“Female International Author, no limits to imagination and
fantasies, prefers group macho/sadistic interaction . . . stop by my
house at [current address] . . . . Will take calls day or night at
[current telephone number] . . . I promise you everything you ever
dreamt about. Serious responses only.”1
Or, imagine the fear generated by the following e-mail messages sent over and over again
from someone who remained anonymous, but seemed to have specific knowledge of the
recipient’s personal life:
“I’m just your worst nightmare. Your troubles are just beginning.”2
Or, imagine the terror experienced by a woman who discovers a Website with the
following message and realizes that she is the “her”:
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“Oh great, now I’m really depressed, hmmm . . . looks like it’s
suicide for me. Car accident? Wrists? A few days later I think,
‘hey,’ why don’t I kill her, too? =)”3
All of these messages are examples of cyberstalking. Generally defined, stalking
involves repeated harassing or threatening behavior.4 Today, advances in technology
have created a new crime — cyberstalking.5 While there is not a universally accepted
definition, cyberstalking involves the use of the Internet, e-mail, or other means of
electronic communication to stalk (or harass) another individual. 6 The use of electronic
technology has broadened the ways stalkers can harass their victims.
This is a real problem. A 1999 Report from the Department of Justice suggests
there might be tens of thousands of cyberstalking incidents each year.7 For example, the
Department of Justice reported in Los Angeles twenty percent of the 600 stalking cases
were classified as cyberstalking; while in New York over forty percent of the stalking
cases were classified as cyberstalking.8 “There link between cyberstalking and the sexual
abuse of children is also recognized by the U.S. government.”9
3
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This article explores why the nature of cyberstalking represents a form of
behavior that is distinct from “offline stalking”10 such that the interpretation of many of
the statutes dealing with offline stalking may be inadequate to address the problem.11
The first part of this article explores the differences between offline stalking and
cyberstalking. The second part examines what the criminal elements of cyberstalking
should be in light of these differences. The third part considers how these differences
create gaps in both state and federal stalking statutes so that it may be difficult to
adequately prosecute all aspects of cyberstalking. This section also suggests ways to
close these gaps and deal with potential The fourth part deals with potential issues in
criminalizing cyberstalking and how these issues might be resolved. Finally, the
Appendix to the article sets forth all state and federal stalking laws and how they might
currently deal with cyberstalking, if at all.
This article is limited to exploring cyberstalking in the criminal context. There is
a host of other legal issues, particularly in the civil realm, which is beyond the scope of
this article.12
I. Cyberstalking vs. Offline Stalking
a. Brief Review of Offline Stalking
While cyberstalking is as recent a phenomena as the Internet itself, even offline
10

For purposes of this article, “offline stalking” refers to stalking that occurs without communication via
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11
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with their harasser.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberstalking.
12
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HIGH TECH. L.J. 115 (2000) (addressing the issue of vicarious liability for Internet Service Providers in
cyberstalking cases). In a later article, I intend to explore potential civil remedies for cyberstalking.
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stalking is a relatively new crime. Generally, the goal of a stalker is to exert “control”
over the victim by instilling fear in her; and often such conduct leads to physical action.13
California enacted the first stalking statute (targeted at offline stalking) in 1990 in
response to the murder of Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the television series My Sister Sam.
Schaeffer was helpless in stopping an obsessed fan who had stalked her for over two
years. The stalking escalated and the fan eventually attacked and murdered her.14
Other states, and soon the federal government, followed California’s lead and
enacted stalking statutes to “fill gaps in the law.”15 Legislatures importantly recognized
the need to stop stalkers before the stalking developed “into a more serious threat to a
victim’s personal safety.”16

Additionally, stalking laws were enacted “to eliminate

behaviors which disrupt normal life for the victim, and to prevent such behaviors from
escalating into violence.”17 Statutes dealing with offline stalking were both preventative
and proactive because they were intended to “criminalize certain acts of harassment in
order to prevent more serious violent conduct by the stalker.”18
Despite the enactment of these laws, offline stalking is still a major problem. In
this country alone, almost half a million victims are stalked each year, and approximately
eighty-five percent are ordinary people without any celebrity or public status. 19 Offline
stalking has “a profound effect upon the victim” by causing post-traumatic stress

13

See id. at 120-25.
Wayne R. LaFave, Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof, in SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW CURRENT
THROUGH THE 2006 UPDATE, PART THREE — OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON, 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 16.4(b)
Stalking (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof].
15
Curry v. State, 811 So. 2d 736, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
16
Id. at 743.
17
James Thomas Tucker, Stalking the Problems With Stalking Laws: The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes
Section 784.048, 45 FLA. L. REV. 609, 617 (1993).
18
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19
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14
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disorder, depression20 and serious emotional distress, and also by escalating to physical
attacks. While the goal — to control and intimidate — is similar in both offline stalking
and cyberstalking cases, there are differences in how the cyberstalker achieves this goal.
These differences create legal problems for victims of cyberstalking.
b. Differences Between Cyberstalking and Offline Stalking
Some experts believe that cyberstalking is synonymous with traditional offline
stalking because of the similarities in content and intent. 21 Similarities that are pointed to
include: a desire to exert control over the victim;22 and, much like offline stalking,
cyberstalking involves repeated harassing or threatening behavior, which is often a
prelude to more serious behavior.23 While these similarities do exist, cyberstalking
differs from offline stalking in four important ways. These differences are crucial
because they are the reasons why offline stalking statutes may fall short of addressing
cyberstalking.
1. Cyberstalkers can use the Internet to instantly harass their victims with
wide dissemination. Cyberstalking takes place over the Internet. While obvious, this
distinction is extremely important because the Internet is a borderless medium that allows
instantaneous and anonymous distribution of one’s message. In this cyber-age, Internet
Websites, e-mail, chat rooms, anonymous electronic bulletin boards, instant messaging,
and other Web communication devices allow cyberstalkers to quickly disseminate
intimidating and threatening messages. Moreover, Internet content can be widely

20

Physical Harm and Apprehension Thereof, supra note ____.
Servance, supra note ____, at 1219.
22
Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 1.
23
Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 1; Harry Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A
Quest for Sound Internet Safety Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 54 (2004).
21
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distributed to a larger, more public forum than any conventional form of offline stalking
and it can be done so inexpensively and efficiently.
For example, an offline stalker may harass the victim by repeatedly telephoning
the victim. However, every telephone call is a single event that requires the stalker’s
action and time. This behavior can easily snowball online because, with only one action,
the stalker can create a harassing e-mail message that the computer systematically and
repeatedly sends to the victim thousands upon thousands of times (e.g., an “e-mail
bomb”).24
Moreover, cyberstalkers can create a Website where they post harassing and
threatening statements. Thus, instead of sending harassing letters, the cyberstalker has
the ability to post threatening comments for the whole world to view. Such Websites
allow for constant harassment, which compounds the invasion of privacy and ultimately
the impact of cyberstalking.25
2. Cyberstalkers can be physically far removed from their victim. Offline
stalking often entails situations where the stalker is physically near the victim (i.e., in the
same geographical area). 26 Cyberstalkers, however, can use the Internet to terrify their
victim no matter where in the world she is; thus, she simply cannot escape. The
seemingly unlimited reach of the Internet makes cyberstalking distinct from offline
stalking in three ways.
First, it provides cyberstalkers a cheap and easy way to continue to contact their
victim from anywhere in the world. Cyberstalkers can stalk their victims from a different
city, state, or even country, so long as there is access to the Internet, a medium which is
24

BOCIJ, supra note ___ at 2.
HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 100-116.
26
Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 3; Valetk, supra note ____, at 54.
25
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likely cheaper to use than a telephone and faster than mail. Second, there is a sinister
element to the secrecy of the cyberstalker’s location. The uncertainty of the
cyberstalker’s location can leave the victim in a state of constant panic as she is left
wondering whether her stalker is in a neighboring house or a neighboring state.27 Finally,
the physical location of the cyberstalker can create several jurisdictional problems.
Because cyberstalking can easily take place across state lines, state prosecutors may
confront jurisdictional problems in enforcing any state laws.
3. Cyberstalkers can remain nearly anonymous.28 There is a common
misperception that cyberstalking is less dangerous than offline stalking because it does
not involve physical contact.29 The opposite, however, is true. While a potential stalker
may be unwilling to personally confront the victim, the anonymity of the Internet allows
individuals, who may not otherwise engage in offline stalking, to send a harassing or
threatening electronic communication.30
The environment of cyberspace is designed to allow individuals to overcome
personal inhibitions. The ability to send anonymous harassing or threatening
communications allows a perpetrator to overcome any hesitation, unwillingness, or
inabilities he may encounter when confronting a victim in person. Perpetrators may even
27

See, e.g., Louse Ellison, Cyberstalking: Tackling Harassment on the Internet, in CRIME AND THE
INTERNET (David S. Wall ed., 2001).
28
The issue of whether anonymity should be regulated on the Internet is a current debate. See, e.g., George
F. du Pont, The Criminalization of True Anonymity in Cyberspace, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
191, 196-216 (2000-2001). Du Pont’s analysis distinguishes between “true anonymity,” which is
untraceable, and “pseudo-anonymity,” which, although indirectly, is inherently traceable. He cites a
historical precedent for pseudo-anonymity, and realizes its social good for anonymous public debate (i.e.,
the American Revolutionary period, The Federalist Papers, modern political campaigns, etc.). Where the
courts and history have recognized a free speech value to anonymity, it has almost always meant pseudoanonymity. But true anonymity is prone to abuse and danger. Cyberspace has greatly increased the ease
with which true anonymity can be attained. Du Pont’s proposal is to criminalize all non-privileged, truly
anonymous communication in cyberspace, and mandate that all anonymous communication in cyberspace
be merely pseudo-anonymous. See id. at 196-216.
29
Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2001).
30
See BOCIJ, supra note ____, at 90-106.
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be encouraged to continue these acts.31 Additionally, the anonymity of the Internet
allows cyberstalkers to follow and spy on their victims in cyberspace for extended
periods of time without the victim’s knowledge.32
As one scholar has explained, there is a “veil of anonymity” on the Internet that
puts cyberstalkers “at an advantage.”33 Anonymity makes it difficult to identify, locate,
and arrest stalkers. In fact, cyberstalkers can use technologies to strip away many
identifying markers from their communications. 34
4. Cyberstalkers can easily impersonate the victim. Unlike offline stalking, the
cyberstalker can easily take on the identity of the victim and create havoc on-line. The
cyberstalker, pretending to be the victim, can send lewd e-mails, post inflammatory
messages on multiple bulletin boards, and offend hundreds of chat room participants.
The victim is then banned from bulletin boards, accused of improper conduct, and
flooded with threatening messages from those the stalker offended in the victim’s name.
This is exactly what happened to Jane Hitchcock who was cyberstalked by the
owner of a company after she complained about the company’s services. Intending to
provoke others, the cyberstalker impersonated Hitchcock and posted inflammatory
comments on Web pages and sent e-mails in her name aimed at provoking others to
“flame” her. 35 Moreover, for over a year, the cyberstalker “e-mail bomb[ed]” her by

31

Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 2.
Such conduct would still be considered harassment if the cyberstalker has the intent to harass the victim.
See U.S. Department of Justice, 1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and
Industry — A Report From the Attorney General to the Vice President, 12 (Aug. 1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm (last visited Aug. 2005)[hereinafter 1999
Report on Cyberstalking].
33
Amy C. Radosevich, Note, Thwarting the Stalker: Are Anti-Stalking Measures Keeping Pace with
Today’s Stalkers?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1371, 1387 (2000).
34
Radosevich, supra note ____, at 1388.
35
For example, impersonating Hitchcock, the cyberstalker sent the following e-mail to her employer: “I’m
an assistant teacher at UMUC and I think you and the whole of UMUC are a bunch of morons insidiously
32
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sending thousands of harassing messages to her e-mail account. He would also send
thousands of harassing messages to her husband’s and her employer’s e-mail accounts,
sometime impersonating Hitchcock, which eventually flooded the accounts rendering
them “useless.”36

The cyberstalker’s actions became so unbearable that Hitchcock was

forced to physically move, but that did not stop him. He eventually found her on-line and
would begin to harass her again. Hitchcock sued him,37 but the cyberstalker was never
held criminally liable.38
5. Cyberstalkers can encourage “innocent” third-party harassment.39
Perhaps most frightening, and unique to cyberstalking, is that cyberstalkers can incite
other “innocent” third parties to do their stalking for them. For example, in California, a
fifty-year-old defendant used the Internet to solicit the rape of a twenty-eight-year-old
woman who had rejected the defendant’s romantic advances. 40 The defendant then
terrorized her by impersonating her in various Internet chat rooms and posting her
telephone number, address, and messages that she fantasized of being raped. Because of
these messages, on separate occasions, at least six men knocked on the woman’s door
saying that they wanted to rape her.41 Hitchcock experienced a similar form of

festering away your small brains. I may or may not resign. I may stay to awaken you idiots . . . .”
HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 8.
36
HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 5-14.
37
Id. See also BOCIJ, supra note ____, at 1-3.
38
Hitchcock sued her cyberstalker who eventually settled. The cyberstalker also pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit mail fraud and perjury for the conduct related to Hitchcock’s original complaints. However, he
was never prosecuted for any crime related to stalking or harassment. BOCIJ, supra note ____, at 2.
39
Other scholars have referred to this as “stalking by-proxy.” See BOCIJ, supra note ____, at 25-26.
40
See Bill Wallace, Stalkers Find a New Tool -- The Internet
E-mail Is Increasingly Used to Threaten and Harass, Authorities Say, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jul. 10, 2000,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/07/10/MN39633.DTL.
41
See id.
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cyberstalking when her cyberstalker advertised her telephone and address on an alt-sex
site advertising for “sadistic interaction.”42
Another example of duping “innocent” third parties to do the harassing involves a
cyberstalker that sent hate e-mail in his victim’s name, often times with her telephone
number and address, “to groups of Satanist, drug users and pornographers.”43 She only
discovered this when the cyberstalker’s actions prompted a threatening and terrifying
telephone call from a man who lived twenty minutes from her: “’You’d better get a gun
because the next time we read about you it will be in a police report.’”44 It was later
discovered that the cyberstalker was the victim’s disgruntled business acquaintance, but
the victim had no criminal recourse.45
In the end, the Internet makes many of the frightening characteristics of offline
stalking even more intense. It provides cyberstalkers with twenty-four-hour access,
instantaneous connection, efficient and repetitious action, and anonymity. On top of all
that, cyberstalkers can easily pretend that they are different people. The possibilities
open to cyberstalkers are as endless as the borders of the ubiquitous Internet. It is for
these reasons that the laws should be updated to deal with this new crime.46

42

HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 11.
N.Y. State Assemb. A05376 (N.Y. 2006), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A05376.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See, e.g., Radosevich, supra note ____, at 1389. (“Until broader language is implemented to cover the
use of new information technologies and methodologies in [cyber]stalking cases, victims may have to
search for alternative solutions”). Some of those solutions include: utilizing more computer specialists on
law enforcement task forces; combating technology with technology by providing computerized response
systems for victims; launching public awareness campaigns and educational Websites so that victims are
informed of their options and rights; and getting Internet Service Providers involved in the regulation
process. Id. at 1391-95.
43
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II. Examining the Criminal Elements of Cyberstalking
Since there are differences between cyberstalking and offline stalking, the
question arises whether the current stalking laws, which were drafted to criminalize
offline stalking, are adequate to deal with all aspects of cyberstalking. The answer – not
fully. Therefore, the remainder of this article sets forth what the elements of
cyberstalking should be in order to adequately deal with the crime.
The Appendix to this article summarizes the current stalking laws in all fifty
states and the federal equivalents. The Appendix sets forth whether the statute
specifically addresses cyberstalking and, if not, how the existing stalking statute might be
used to prosecute cyberstalking crimes. Those statutes that have attempted to incorporate
cyberstalking into their offline stalking statutes are often inadequate because of the
differences between cyberstalking and offline stalking. Indeed, even some of the statutes
that were enacted to target cyberstalking still fail to address all of its vices.47 To
understand these inadequacies, the general elements of offline stalking need to be
considered in comparison to what the elements should be for this new crime of
cyberstalking.48
As set forth in this next section, cyberstalking and offline stalking should share
the same intentional mental state requirement; but, to be effective, cyberstalking statutes
should criminalize conduct that either puts a “reasonable person” in fear of bodily harm
or causes severe emotional distress. Furthermore, the cyberstalking statute should

47

See infra Appendix to this article.
Because stalking statutes are all over the board, this next section is not intended to summarize all
harassment laws. However, it does attempt to generally categorize the statutes to determine what
requirements are most adequate to combat cyberstalking.

48
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specifically address situations where the cyberstalker entices third parties to harass for
them.
a. The “intentional” mens rea requirement. As with most crimes, offline
stalking has both mens rea and actus reus requirements.49 Generally, a stalker must
“willfully or intentionally” (mental state) engage in “repetitive conduct” or a “course of
conduct” (actus reus) that causes the victim to fear, or that the stalker should have known
would cause the victim to fear for her safety.50 Although there are many differences in
offline stalking statutes, the majority of them have a similar intentional mental state
requirement.51
As far as cyberstalking is concerned, this “intentional” mental state requirement is
appropriate. The point of cyberstalking laws, much like offline stalking statutes, should
be to stop individuals from purposefully causing another to fear.52 Like an offline stalker,
a cyberstalker should have to “intentionally” engage in conduct that causes his target to
fear for her safety (or should have known would cause fear for her safety).
b. The need to criminalize a “course of conduct” that would cause a
“reasonable person” to fear for her safety. A more difficult analysis arises concerning
the actus reus requirement. What “conduct” should be criminal? There are two

49

See, e.g., United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 121 (3d ed. 2003) (specifying that crimes conventionally have both
elements).
50
See infra Appendix to this article. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 (2005) (“Stalking” requires that a
person intentionally follow or harass another person, and intend to place this other person in reasonable fear
of death or serious bodily harm.). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 (2005) (“A person commits stalking if
the person intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct that is directed toward another person,
and if that conduct” would cause a reasonable person fear.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (2005)
(“Stalking is the intentional and repeated following or harassing of another person that would cause a
reasonable person to feel fear….”). But see ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260- 41.270 (2004) (requiring only
that the perpetrator “knowingly” engage in a course of conduct that recklessly places another person in fear
of death or physical injury).
51
See infra Appendix to this article.
52
See id.

- 12 -

Naomi Goodno
Cyberstalking

considerations here. First, most offline stalking statutes require the conduct be
“repetitive.” In other words, to be in violation of the law, the stalker has to engage in
conduct at least more than once in such a way that causes the victim to fear. 53 This
requirement is suitably applicable to cyberstalking. It is appropriate to require that the
cyberstalker engage in “repeated” conduct—e.g., e-mailing a harassing message more
than once; or posting a message on a website that causes others to harass the victim more
than once.
The second consideration, however, is where the real issue arises when offline
stalking laws are applied to cyberstalking. This second matter concerns the type of
conduct that is criminal. Generally,54 there are three different types of conduct that
offline stalking statutes criminalize: (1) conduct requiring an element of physical or
visible proximity to the victim; 55 (2) conduct conveying verbal or written threats or
threats implied by conduct, i.e., a “credible threat”;56 and (3) conduct that would cause a
“reasonable person” to fear physical harm or to suffer severe emotional distress
(hereinafter the “reasonable person standard”).57 As set forth below, statutes in
categories one or two fall far short in combating cyberstalking because such statutes
focus solely on the perpetrator’s conduct. On the other hand, laws with a “reasonable

53

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2005) (defining course of conduct as conduct composed of
two or more acts separated by at least thirty-six hours, but occurring within one year); see also infra
Appendix to this article.
54
It is difficult to attempt to categorize all stalking statutes because there is a huge variety in defining what
conduct constitutes “stalking.” See, e.g., Keirsten L. Walsh, Comment, Safe and Sound at Last?
Federalized Anti-Stalking Legislation in the United States and Canada, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 373 (1996).
For purposes of this article, the laws have been generally divided into three categories to illustrate what
elements best define cyberstalking; however, not all stalking laws necessarily distinctly fit into one of the
three categories.
55
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 (2005).
56
See, e.g,, ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(4) (2004); see also infra Appendix to this article.
57
See, e.g, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2005); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-181e (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-7905 to -7906 (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.749 (West 2005); see also infra Appendix to this article.
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person” standard can fully address cyberstalking because such laws correctly focus on the
effect of the perpetrator’s conduct on the victim (e.g., the fear felt by the victim).58
(i) Problems with physical proximity requirement. Currently, there are only a
few offline stalking statutes that require that the defendant engage in conduct that has
some requirement of actual physical pursuit.59 Since the very nature of cyberstalking
allows the cyberstalker to be in an entirely different physical location than his victim,
statutes that require an element of physical or visual proximity cannot address the crime.
For example, in one 1996 cyberstalking case in Georgia, a cyberstalker posted a
crude message on a website that gave his victim’s telephone number and home address
and advertised that she was a prostitute. Many responded to the message by calling and
showing up at her front door and “innocently” harassed the victim.60 Under Georgia’s
stalking statute at that time (the statute has since been amended), 61 the cyberstalker was
found innocent of stalking because his conduct did not include the physical pursuit of the
victim.62
(ii) Problems with credible threat requirement. Many current stalking statutes
require the perpetrator to make a “credible threat” of violence against the victim.63
Generally, a credible threat is “a verbal or written threat” coupled “with the apparent

58

Joseph C. Merschman, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for Contemporary
Legislation, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 255, 260 (2001).
59
See, e.g, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181c (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2005); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-802 (West 2005) (formerly MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 124); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:12-10 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5
(West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (2005); see also infra Appendix to this article.
60
See Working to Stop Online Abuse, http://www.cyberstalked.org/ourstory.
61
GA CODE ANN. § 46-5-21 (West 2006).
62
See Working to Stop Online Abuse, http://www.cyberstalked.org/ourstory.
63
Over one-third of state stalking statutes have a credible threat requirement. See infra Appendix to this
article; see also Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 1.
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ability to carry out the threat” so as to cause the victim fear.64 It is the requirement of the
“threat” and the “apparent ability” to carry it out that makes this standard inadequate to
deal with cyberstalking in at least four ways.
First, the requirement that there be an overt “threat” is problematic. Such a
requirement leaves a gap for punishment of conduct that does not specifically threaten,
but would still cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety. Stalkers typically do not
explicitly threaten their victims, but instead “pursue a course of conduct that, when taken
in the aggregate, would cause fear in a reasonable person but stops short of a [] threat.”65
For example, an offline stalker may lurk behind bushes to watch the victim,
follow her, continuously call her and hang-up, and send black roses to her. Since none of
these actions include an overt threat, such punishment would likely not establish the
credible threat requirement. In cyberstalking cases, a statute with a credible threat
requirement does not protect against electronic communications (such as thousands of email messages) that are harassing, but do not include an actual threat.66
These issues associated with a credible threat standard are being litigated in
offline stalking cases. One state replaced the credible threat requirement in its stalking
statute with a reasonable person standard because of these issues-issues which become
even more acute in cyberstalking cases.67 In Iowa v. Limbrecht,68 the court recognized
the change in the statute and explained that whether a stalking conviction would be
reversed depended on which standard applied. The Limbrecht defendant, a prison inmate
64

CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2006) (emphasis added).
Merschman, supra note ___ at 260.
66
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2005) (harassing electronic communications do not constitute
cyberstalking unless there is a credible threat). See Iowa v. Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1999);
United States v. Alkabazah, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
67
Compare IOWA CODE § 780.11 (1993), with IOWA CODE § 780.11 (2006).
68
Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 316-17.
65
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became obsessed with a young woman, Stacy Corey, who worked as an employee at the
prison. The defendant’s repetitive, intimidating stares and lies to other inmates about
how he had sexual relations with her forced Corey to quit and move.69 However, the
defendant’s obsession continued when he was released from prison. He found Corey’s
new address and sent vulgar, untrue letters to Corey’s husband about how Corey had
sexual relations with many inmates when she worked at the prison.70 The defendant also
drove by Corey’s house a number of times, which ultimately led to his arrest and stalking
conviction.71 The defendant appealed his conviction arguing that he never explicitly
threatened to hurt Corey. The court acknowledged that the defendant never threatened
Corey, but rejected his argument because it “harken[ed] back” to the former version of
the stalking statute which required proof of a “credible threat” against another person.72
Under the amended version of the statute which adopted the reasonable person standard,
the court found that the defendant’s actions assumed frightening proportions and was no
less threatening than an actual threat.73
As exemplified by Limbrecht, the issue of whether a credible threat requirement is
the appropriate standard is being debated in offline stalking cases. 74 This issue, however,

69

Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 317.
Id. at 318-19.
71
Id. at 319.
72
Id. See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11(1)(a) (West 1993) (defining a “credible threat” as “a threat made
with the intent to place a reasonable person in like circumstances in fear of death or bodily injury, coupled
with the apparent ability to carry out the threat.”).
73
Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 319 (citing IOWA CODE § 708.11(1)(b) (1997)). See also 1994 IOWA ACTS
1093, § 4.
74
When determining whether to adopt a credible threat requirement or reasonable person standard, the
drafters of the federal model rule specifically choose to use the reasonable person standard instead of the
credible threat requirement. See Walsh, supra note ____, at 389 (“On the other hand, the model code did
not use the language ‘credible threat’ when defining the behavior directed toward the victim. In order to
prohibit behavior in the form of threats implied by conduct, the model code purposely omitted this
language for fear it would be construed as requiring an actual verbal or written threat.”).
70
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is even more acute with cyberstalking.75 The Internet makes it easier for a cyberstalker to
engage in a threatening course of conduct in a much shorter period of time than an offline
stalker. In Limbrecht, the stalker sent two letters over the course of one month.76
Cyberstalkers, on the other hand, can easily use the Internet to send hundreds, even
thousands, of frightening e-mail messages (similar the letters sent in Limbrecht) in a
matter of one hour,77 which over days and weeks can create havoc on a victim. If there is
not one explicit threat in any of those thousands of e-mail messages, then the victim
cannot establish the credible threat requirement. 78
A second problem with a credible threat requirement in cyberstalking cases is an
issue of receipt. A “threat” suggests a communication directly from the stalker to the
victim. But a cyberstalker can easily post terrifying messages without ever being in
direct contact with the victim or without the victim ever personally receiving the
message. A cyberstalker can broadcast harassing messages to the entire Internet world by
posting them on Web pages and blogs. In cyberstalking cases then, the stalker can
quickly and effortlessly engage in terrifying conduct to harass the victim—conduct no
less threatening than an actual threat—with world-wide dissemination.

75
Report to Congress, supra note ____, at 45 n.3. See also Federal Interstate Stalking Statute, 18 U.S.C. §
2261A (2006) (codifying a “reasonable fear” standard).
76
Limbrecht, 600 N.W.2d at 317-18.
77
For example, a cyberstalker can send “e-mail bombs”—meaning that the cyberstalker can generate one email message and use the computer to continuously send the same message over-and-over to the same
recipient.
78
The overt threat also usually has to be verbal or written, which may also raise issues in cyberstalking
cases. A “verbal” threat requires physical nearness to the victim, which, analogous to statutes that have a
“physical proximity” requirement, unnecessarily carves out many cyberstalking cases since the stalking
takes place virtually. A “written” threat requirement seems more applicable to cyberstalking, but even that
may be problematic. If the statute has a written threat requirement, but does not make clear that “written”
includes “electronic communication,” then some computer generated messages may not be included. Many
statutes do not cover the various types of electronic communications (e.g., e-mail, message boards, chat
rooms, blogs, instant messenger, etc.). See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.130-.150 (West 2005); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3A-3 to -3A-3.1 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.60 (McKinney 2005).
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For example, in one case, a cyberstalker created a webpage “dedicated” to his
young victim, Amy Boyer.79 The cyberstalker was a fellow student who, unbeknownst to
Boyer, wrote detailed fantasies about Boyer and messages about Boyer’s daily life (such
as what she wore on any particular day, where she went, what she was doing) and posted
them on the webpage. These postings went on for about two years and tragically ended
when the stalker murdered Boyer and committed suicide.80 Neither Boyer nor her family
was aware of any of these messages on the website until after she was murdered.
Although this case was never litigated, it might have been difficult for Boyer to establish
that there was a credible threat. A threat was never sent directly to her, so it would have
been difficult to show that the cyberstalker actually threatened her.81
A third problem that the credible threat requirement creates in cyberstalking cases
is that it requires the victim to prove that the cyberstalker had the “apparent ability” to
carry out whatever he threatens. What if the cyberstalker sends a threatening e-mail to
the victim from across the country? It would seem that the victim might then have the
burden to prove that the cyberstalker had the financial ability to buy a plane ticket to
travel across the country to carry-out that threat. Such a requirement is onerous and
unnecessary.
In fact, the victim may not even know where an anonymous cyberstalker is
physically located. For all she knows the cyberstalker might be next door, at her
workplace or across the country, making it even more difficult to establish that a threat
could be carried out. The Internet allows for anonymity when sending any type of

79

HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 100-116.
Id.
81
See intra part III of this article (fully explaining United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir.
1997)).
80
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electronic communication. Cyberstalkers covet anonymity because it allows them to hide
from reality and from their victims.82 Victims who are stalked by unknown persons
cannot know the perpetrator’s habits or intentions.83 Thus, as identities are concealed, so
too are all the character traits of the perpetrators. Where the identities and abilities of
cyberstalkers are unknown to the victim, it is impossible for the victim to determine
whether the perpetrator has the apparent ability to carry out the threat. Thus, it will be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to show that an anonymous cyberstalker has the
ability to carry out any threat.
The fourth problem with the credible threat requirement in cyberstalking cases is
that it completely fails to address cases where the cyberstalker incites “innocent” third
parties to harass the victim. 84 In situations where, for example, the cyberstalkers take on
the identity of the victim and post messages inviting gang rape, there is neither an overt
threat, nor a threat sent from the cyberstalker directly to the victim.
In short, statutes—either those that have attempted to incorporate cyberstalking in
preexisting statutes or those that have been specifically targeted at cyberstalking—which
have a credible threat requirement cannot fully address all aspects of cyberstalking. This
is because they focus on the cyberstalker’s conduct. The reasonable person standard,
however, is better in cyberstalking cases because it focuses on the fear that the
cyberstalker intentionally meant to instill in his victim.

82

Rebecca K. Lee, Romantic and Electronic Stalking in a College Context, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
373, 381-82 (1998). Also, because the Internet is “essentially a ‘decontextualized’ medium…people can
send messages without revealing their handwriting or other clues to their personality…. Cyberstalkers can
easily disguise themselves by adopting several false names and forging e-mail messages.” Id. at 409.
Furthermore, a victim may be more hesitant to report a threat if their stalker is anonymous. Id. at 382.
83
Lee, supra note ___ at 382.
84
Rose Hunter, Cyberstalking, (2001), http://gsulaw.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/fa01/hunter/.
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(iii) The reasonable person standard: the appropriate standard. Those
stalking statutes that have a reasonable person standard provide the most successful way
to prosecute cyberstalking.85 Such standard has no physical proximity requirement.
Furthermore, the standard addresses many of the problems created by statutes with a
credible threat requirement. The reasonable person standard does not require that the
cyberstalker send an explicit threat to the victim, nor does it require that the victim prove
the cyberstalker had the ability to carry it out. Instead, the focus is on the victim and
whether it is reasonable for her to fear for her safety because of the cyberstalker’s
conduct.
Distinguishing between statutes that require a credible threat from those that use
the “reasonable person” standard requires careful reading of the entire statute. The
Delaware stalking statute, for example, makes it a crime for a person to intentionally
engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable
person fear.86 Facially, this statute does not appear to require a credible threat. But, it is
important to not immediately assume that this statute focuses only on the fear felt by the
victim. Further reading reveals that “course of conduct” includes either maintaining
physical proximity to the victim, conveying a verbal or written threat, or a threat implied

85

For purposes of this paper, the “reasonable person standard’ is similar to statutes that criminalizes
repeated conduct that “harasses,” “annoys,” or “alarms” (hereinafter “harassment statutes”). Some states
have two statutes, one dealing with stalking and the other harassment. Often, the harassment statutes adopt
the broad “to harass” standard. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-182b (West 2005); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-17-07 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.230 (West 2005). See also infra Appendix to
this article. The harassment standard may encompass many of the same cyberstalking situations that would
be addressed by the reasonable person standard; however, as set forth in this section the best standard to
apply to cyberstalking would be the reasonable standard. Moreover, many of the harassment statutes are
limited to misdemeanors. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2005); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 653m (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§
1311-12 (2005); see also infra Appendix to this article.
86
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (2005).
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by conduct (a standard akin to a “credible threat”).87 Thus, even though the “reasonable
person” language appears in the statute, a full reading of it shows that it might be
equivalent to all other cyberstalking statutes requiring a credible threat.
(iv) Criminalizing situations where the cyberstalkers entice “innocent” thirdparties to harass.
One of the most apparent differences between cyberstalking and stalking is that
cyberstalkers can entice third parties to do the work for them.88 Currently, only one state
has taken the approach to specifically criminalize such behavior. 89 This is the best
approach. So that neither cyberstalkers nor victims are unclear that this conduct is
criminal, statutes criminalizing cyberstalking should directly provide that no person
should use the Internet to cause another to engage in conduct that would cause a
reasonable person to fear for her safety.
III.

Current Laws Dealing with Cyberstalking
a. Addressing the Gaps in State Laws
As illustrated in the Appendix to this article, state statutes that might be used to

prosecute cyberstalking do not have clear and equal standards. Rather, they are all over
the board.90 Statutes with a physical proximity or a credible threat requirement are
impractical and ineffective in prosecuting cyberstalkers. Statutes that are most useful and
successful in prosecuting cyberstalkers and protecting victims are those which shift the
focus from the perpetrator’s behavior to the effect on the victim.91

87

Id. See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2005) (“Course of conduct” requires either repeatedly
maintaining a visual or physical proximity, or a threat).
88
See supra part I of this article.
89
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21 (B) (West 2005).
90
See infra Appendix to this article.
91
Merschman, supra note ____, at 255-56.
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Generally, there are three categories of state laws.92 The laws in each of these
categories have gaps such that they may not fully be able to address all aspects of
cyberstalking. Each of these categories is taken in turn.
1. State statutes that do not address cyberstalking.
First, there are some state laws that do not address cyberstalking at all. Most
obvious are those statutes that have physical pursuit requirements.93 There are other
statutes that do not address cyberstalking because it is unclear if they cover any form of
electronic communication.94 For example, some states have a telephone harassment
statute, but the statute only covers telephone communications (not specifically electronic
communications).95 Laws that require physical pursuit and laws that fail to include
electronic communications cannot reach cyberstalking.
2. Gaps in state statutes that may address some aspects of cyberstalking.
The second general category of state statutes encompasses the majority of the
current state laws. The laws in this category raise three issues.
First, some states have attempted to amend existing offline stalking statutes to
cover cyberstalking via “electronic communications.”96 The type of electronic
communications covered by these statutes varies. While some states simply inserted the
92

As set forth in the Appendix to this article, the state stalking and harassment laws are literally all over the
board. This section attempts to generally categorize them to show why some of the laws do not work in
cyberstalking cases, and why others may work in part. The Appendix, however, provides a specific
analysis for each state law. See infra Appendix to this article.
93
See, e.g, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181 (West 2005); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-802 (West
2005) (formerly MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 124); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 120.55 (McKinney 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.60 (McKinney 2005); see also infra Appendix to this
article.
94
See, e.g, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181e (West 2005);
D.C. CODE § 22-404 (2005); see also infra Appendix to this article.
95
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4113 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-96 (West 2005).
96
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (West 2005) ("contact" means “any communication including but
not limited to communication by computer, computer network, or by any other electronic device.”); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 711-1106.4 to -1106.5 (LexisNexis 2005) (non-consensual contact includes contact via
electronic mail transmission).
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general phrase “electronic communications” into existing statutes, others identified
specific types of communications (e.g., e-mails, computer communications, or
communications on the network).97 Although it is promising that some states are
beginning to take notice of cyberstalking crimes, the results thus far have been a wide
variety of mostly inadequate statutes with a hodgepodge of definitions, requirements,
protections, and penalties.
Amending current stalking statutes to include electronic communications is a step
in the right direction. Unfortunately, this is not enough. For example, New York’s antistalking laws covers electronic communications,98 but state legislatures have introduced
bills targeted specifically at cyberstalking and at making it a felony.99 This suggests that
simply amending preexisting stalking statutes may be insufficient to combat
cyberstalking.
Moreover, while some statutes may cover electronic communications, the
language of the statutes seems to suggest that it would only apply to messages sent
directly to the victim (e.g., an e-mail sent directly from the cyberstalker to his victim), but
not to other Internet postings.100 Such statutes may unnecessarily carve out those

97

See, e.g., infra Appendix to this article; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2005) (including a computer
with in the meaning of an “electronic communication device,” and defining “electronic communications”
according to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006)); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1106.4 to -1106.5 (LexisNexis
2005) (“Non-consensual contact” includes contact via electronic mail transmission); GA. CODE ANN. § 165-90 (West 2005) (including, but not limiting communication to communication by computer, computer
network, or by any other electronic device); see also, Shawn Hutton & Sandy Haantz, Cyberstalking,
(National White Collar Crime Center), www.nw3c.org. The investigators and prosecutors of these units
receive continual training in the fields of computer networks, surveillance, evidence gathering, as well as
the proper resources to address these technical claims.
98
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.45-50 (McKinney 2005).
99
N.Y. State Assemb. A05376 (N.Y. 2006), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A05376.
100
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805(a) (West 2005); see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260 to
41.270 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-209(a)(1) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (2005);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183 (West 2005);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-182b (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-7906(2)(a) (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2(a)(4)(A)-(B) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. §
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cyberstalking cases like the Boyer case where the stalker created an entire website
dedicated to following her every move, but never sent an e-mail directly to her.101 It also
carves out those cases where the cyberstalker encourages “innocent” third party
harassment.
This leads to the second issue. There is also a group of offline stalking statutes
that have a credible threat requirement or the equivalent. There are many laws that
require that the electronic communication between the cyberstalker and the victim
include a specific threat, which is virtually the same as having a credible threat
standard.102 Other statutes require that the communication contain a credible threat when
the perpetrator is not physically pursuing the victim.103 And, there are even other
statutes that, at first glance, seem to have a reasonable person standard, but upon close
reading still require that a credible threat be made. 104 As set forth earlier in this article, a
statute with a credible threat standard, even where electronic communications are
included, cannot deal with all aspects of cyberstalking.
The final issue is that none of the statutes in this second category explicitly
address situations where the cyberstalker dupes “innocent” third parties to harass his
victim. For a few states, there may be a way to address this issue with the current laws,
however, it has not yet been litigated. Some states have two types of general statutes
708.71(a)(1) (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.080 (West 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315
(West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (LexisNexis 2005).
101
HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 112.
102
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.10 (West 2005).
103
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 (2005) (requiring an actual threat when the perpetrator is
not physically pursuing the victim); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (West 2005) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1312A (2005) (same).
104
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1312A (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210A(2)(A) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07
(2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(a)(ii) (2005); see also
infra Appendix to this article.
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that might address cyberstalking – those directed at stalking and those directed at
harassment.105 Generally, harassment statutes has a broader reach addressing those
situations where the stalker engages in conduct with intent to “annoy,” “harass,” or
“alarm” the victim.106 Such a standard is more akin to the reasonable person standard
since it does not require a credible threat. Arguably, when a stalker entices a third party
to do the stalking, he has annoyed and harassed his victim. However, even if this
argument is successfully made--which is yet to be seen--most of the state statutes that
have this broad harassment standard only establish misdemeanors, not felonies.107
3. Gaps in state statutes that are intended to address cyberstalking.
The last category of state laws is comprised of a small group of statutes that
specifically deal with cyberstalking. As of August 2006, there are only six states
(Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington) that
enacted new “cyberstalking” statutes.108 Importantly, these states passed criminal laws
specifically dealing with cyberstalking even though they already had offline stalking
statutes with a “reasonable person standard” or a more general harassment standard.109
105

See infra Appendix to this article.
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1106 (LexisNexis 2005). IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-10-1, 5(b)(1)(B) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A
(2005).
107
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West
2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1311-12 (2005); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7 (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
525.080 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411h (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225
(West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575 (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (2005).
108
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3 (2005); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2005).
109
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 135/1-2 (West 2005) (harassment); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5
(West 2005) (cyberstalking); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (2005) (stalking); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:40.3 (2005) (cyberstalking); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (West 2005) (stalking with reasonable person
standard); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2005) (cyberstalking); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3
(West 2005) (stalking with reasonable person standard); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (West 2005)
(cyberstalking); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-59-1 and 2 (2004) (stalking with harassment standard); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2004) (cyberstalking); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West 2005) (stalking
106
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The enactment of these cyberstalking statutes illustrates an essential point; namely, these
states recognized that offline stalking statutes, even if amended, are inadequate to deal
with cyberstalking.
For example, Washington’s offline stalking statute criminalizes conduct that the
stalker “[k]nows or reasonably should know [would cause the person to be] afraid,
intimidated, or harassed even if the stalker did not intend to place the person in fear or
intimidate or harass the person.”110 This Washington statute also applies to electronic
communications. 111 Despite that Washington had a stalking statute with the reasonable
person standard that applied to electronic communications, in 2004, the state determined
that the best way to deal with cyberstalking was to enact a law specifically addressing
it.112 Other states should follow Washington’s example.
There are four other states (Florida, Nevada, Delaware, and Virginia) that have
not enacted specific “cyberstalking” laws, but have amended their statutes in such a way
so as to include many aspects of cyberstalking.113 The Florida Legislature, for example,
recognized the dangers of relaxed cyberstalking laws, and amended the Florida stalking
statute to provide criminal penalties for “the willful, malicious, and repeated following,
harassing, or cyberstalking of another person.”114 By definition, “cyberstalk” means “to
engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words,
with a reasonable person standard); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2005) (cyberstalking); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-9a (LexisNexis 2005) (stalking with reasonable person standard); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-3C-14a (LexisNexis 2005) (threatening communications by computer).
110
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(1)(c)(ii) (West 2005) amended by 2006 Wash. Legis. Serv. Page
no. 2 (West).
111
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(2)(b)(4).
112
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2005).
113
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(c)(2)-(3) (West 2005) (stalking statute specifically amended to define the
crime of “cyberstalking;” for a misdemeanor charge only, unless coupled with a credible threat); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1311-12 (2005) (for a misdemeanor charge only); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575
(West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (West 2005) (misdemeanor).
114
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2005).
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images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to
that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”115 A Florida district court expressly
noted that the revised stalking/cyberstalking statute was “designed to protect women
from being harassed…by ensuring that victims did not have to be injured or threatened
with death before stopping a stalker’s harassment.”116 To fully address the gaps in state
laws, state stalking statutes should be reviewed accordingly.117
Although this third group of state laws which overtly deal with cyberstalking is
clearly a step in the right direction, these statutes have gaps as well. Few of them
explicitly address situations where the cyberstalker dupes an “innocent” third party to
harass.118 The Illinois cyberstalking statute, for example, does not explicitly address
incitement of third party harassment.119
Even more problematic are Louisiana’s and North Carolina’s cyberstalking
statutes, which are almost identical to each other. Both of these statutes require that the
harassing electronic communication be sent “to another.”120 Likewise, Mississippi’s
115

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(d).
Lopez v. Lopez, 922 So. 2d 408, 2006 WL 544551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Curry v. State, 811
So. 2d 736, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
117
There is also a huge variety among the penalties for cyberstalking. For example, some statutes that
could be construed to include cyberstalking are “harassment” statutes instead of “stalking” statutes.
Generally, penalties for harassment are less than those for stalking. See Lee, supra note ____, at 380;
Tucker, supra note ____, at 653. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider what the penalties should
be to address and deter cyberstalking crimes.
118
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West 2005); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575(3) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (West 2005); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (West 2005); see also infra Appendix to this
article. But cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-105 (West 2005) (not a stalking statute, but may apply to
third party harassment).
119
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5(b) (West 2005). The Illinois statute does criminalize a course of
conduct which “alarms, torments, or terrorizes that person.” Although it has not yet been litigated, it could
be argued that enticing a third party to “innocently” harass (e.g., posting false advertisements on alternative
sexual websites) constitutes conduct which “alarms” and “terrorize” the victim.
120
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3(b)(2)-(3) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3(b)(2)-(3) (West
2005).
116
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cyberstalking statute also seems to suggest that the stalker has to specifically e-mail the
victim.121 The Florida statute has similar problems since it requires that electronic
communications be “directed at a specific person.”122 This may mean that the
communication must be sent directly to the victim. Such requirements carve out cases
where cyberstalkers dupe “innocent” third parties to do the harassment for them. It also
may not reach cases like the Boyer case where terrifying messages were posted on a
website, but were never sent directly to her.123
At the end of the day, only three states (Ohio,124 Rhode Island,125 and
Washington126) have statutes that explicitly address cases where third parties innocently
harass the victim at the cyberstalker’s bidding. Thus, these three state statutes are the
only current laws that likely deal with all aspects of cyberstalking.127
In sum, there are at least two ways to enact statutes that would fill the gaps in the
state laws. The specific language of the statute that deals with the cyberstalker’s conduct
should set forth an objective standard which focuses on the victim’s fear, rather than a
subjective standard which focuses on the perpetrator’s actions. Thus, cyberstalking
121

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2005).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(d) (West 2005).
123
HITCHCOCK, supra note ____, at 112.
124
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211(A)(2) (West 2005) (“No person, through the use of any electronic
method of remotely transferring information, including, but not limited to, any computer, computer
network, computer program, or computer system, shall post a message with purpose to urge or incite
another to commit a violation of division (A)(1) of this section.”) (emphasis added). This form of
cyberstalking is only a misdemeanor, unless there was an actual threat. § 2903.211(A)(2)(b).
125
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2(a) (2004) (“Whoever transmits any communication by computer to any
person or causes any person to be contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his or her
family is guilty…”)(emphasis added).
126
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(1)(a) (West 2005) (“A person is guilty of cyberstalking if he or she,
with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass any other person, and under circumstances not
constituting telephone harassment, makes an electronic communication to such other person or a third
party…Using any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or obscene words, images, or language, or suggesting the
commission of any lewd or lascivious act.”) (emphasis added).
127
However, even these three laws do not specifically deal with e-mail bombs. Indeed, there are only three
different statutes that overtly address e-mail bombs. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 135/1-2(3.1) (West
2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1027(a)(iii) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(1)(b) (West
2005).
122
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statutes should adopt a reasonable person standard.128 Another way to address the gaps in
the state statutes is to enact laws that specifically criminalize conduct where perpetrators
ruse “innocent” third parties to do the harassment for them.
The inadequacies of current state cyberstalking stalking laws can be remedied
foremost by being proactive, rather than a reactive. It took the Rebecca Schaeffer murder
to rouse the enactment of stalking statutes. Hopefully, there does not have to be an
equivalent cyberstalking case.129 State statutes should be enacted and revised now to deal
with cyberstalking.
While many states are taking active steps to combat the problem of cyberstalking,
there is a complete lack of uniformity in defining the crime. Conduct in one state that is
criminal, may not be so in another.130 Moreover, there are instances where state laws
may not be able reach the conduct at all – namely, where a stalker uses the Internet to
stalk a victim in another state. In such instances, federal laws are paramount; however,
they too have gaps.
b. Addressing the Gaps in Federal Laws
There are three current federal laws which are applicable to cyberstalking.
However, each of these laws as currently interpreted, may fall short of adequately
prosecuting cyberstalkers. This next section takes each of the three federal statutes,
128

Some cyberstalking statutes have adopted a related standard that is just as effective. A few statutes
criminalize conduct that causes the victim to suffer substantial or severe emotional distress. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3 (West 2005). This standard will work in cyberstalking cases because, like the
reasonable person standard, the focus is on the fear instilled in the victim, rather than the cyberstalker’s
conduct.
129
“[C]yberstalking does not end in cyberspace, but usually transcends into real life.” Lee, supra note
____, at 407.
130
See Walsh, supra note ____, at 386-87 (“In many cases, this ambiguity [in offline stalking laws] actually
allowed offenders to ‘slip through the cracks’ of justice, by permitting the judicial system to vindicate only
the rights of those stalking victims who fell prey to behavior criminalized in that particular state. Persons
who engaged in behavior that would be characterized as stalking suffered no legal consequences when that
behavior was not statutorily criminalized.”).
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explains the law as applied to cyberstalking and considers whether they are inadequate to
deal with the crime.
1. Gaps in the Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
The Interstate Communications Act makes it a crime punishable by five years in
prison to transmit “any communication” in interstate commerce containing “any threat”
to injure another person.131 “Any communication” includes threats transmitted across
state lines via the telephone, e-mail, beepers, or the Internet.132 This statute successfully
prosecuted at least one cyberstalker who used the Internet to send threatening e-mail
messages.133
However, the requirement that the communication contain a “threat” is where this
statute falls short because it is akin to a “credible threat” requirement. Thus, the statute
would not be applicable to a cyberstalker who, absent a specific threat, uses the Internet
to engage in a pattern of conduct intended to harass or annoy another.
United States v. Alkhabaz134 is a prime example of why the “threat” requirement is
problematic. In this case, the defendant e-mailed numerous messages to an acquaintance
that included violent sexual fantasies about women and young girls. The defendant
eventually posted an explicitly “depraved torture-and-snuff story” on a chat room where
the rape-victim had the same name as one of his classmates.135 Despite the sadistic story

131

18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
Id.
133
See United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding the defendant’s conviction
even though the defendant sent the e-mail messages to the victim who was in the same state because the email message was sent via interstate telephone lines).
134
United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
135
Id. at 1498 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
132
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about the defendant’s classmate, the court held that he was not in violation of § 875(c),
because he did not make a “communication containing a true threat.”136
Because this statute is limited to only those cyberstalking cases where there has
been a “true” (e.g. credible) threat, it does not address the many situations where the
cyberstalker engages in conduct intended to harass the victim, but without making
explicit threats.
2. Gaps in the Federal Telephone Harassment Statute, 47 U.S.C. § 223.
The Telephone Harassment Statute137 was passed in 1934 — a time when the
telephone, much like the Internet now, was the cutting edge technology of
communication. The statute makes it a crime, punishable by up to two years in prison, to
anonymously and knowingly make a telephone call, or use a “telecommunications
device,” “to annoy, abuse, harass, or threaten” a person.138
Very recently, in January 2006, the federal government attempted to respond to
the cyberstalking problem by trying to ensure that e-mail messages sent via the Internet
were covered by § 223. In the voluminous “Violence Against Women Act” a section
entitled, “Preventing Cyberstalking,”139 amended the statute140 to apply to e-mail
messages.141 Specifically, the definition of the “telecommunications device” was
changed to include “any device or software that can be used to originate
136

Id. at 1497.
47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006).
138
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C).
139
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162,
Title I, § 113, 119 Stat. 2987 (2006) [hereinafter Violence Against Women Act]. As the Summary of the act
explains, “(Sec. 113) Amends the Communications Act of 1934 to apply the prohibitions against certain
communications in interstate of foreign commerce to communications transmitted by the Internet (i.e.,
cyberstalking).” Id. at 2.
140
The House approved it by voice vote, and the Senate unanimously approved it on December 16, 2005.
See Declan McCullagh, Create an E-annoyance, Go to Jail, http:news.com.com/Create+an+eannoyance%2C+go+jail/2010-1028_3-6022491.html.
141
Violence Against Women Act, supra note ____.
137
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telecommunications or other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in
part, by the Internet.”142
While the amendment changed the definition of a “telecommunications device” to
specifically include e-mail,143 it did not change any of the required elements. Thus, for
the statute to be triggered, the cyberstalker would still have to anonymously and
knowingly send a message via the Internet “to annoy, abuse, harass or threaten” a
person.144 The amendment has created some controversy. Proponents call it an answer to
many victims’ cries for “help.”145 But, some critics have complained that the term
“annoy” is too overbroad because it “might characterize a wide range of anonymous
Internet banter that falls far short of cyberstalking.”146
However, it seems unlikely that the amendment would create any constitutional
problems that the courts have not already dealt with. For example, in United States v.
Bowker,147 the Sixth Circuit found that the word “annoy” in the statute was not
unconstitutional because: (1) it upheld Congressional intent to “protect innocent
individuals from fear” without being vague or overbroad; and (2) it did not chill political
142

Id. (adding this language to 47 U.S.C. § 223h(3)(C)).
Even without this amendment, the courts may have interpreted the Internet as a “telecommunication
device.” See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 828-29 (E.D. Pa 1996) (“Clearly, the
sponsors of the CDA [47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)] thought it would reach individual Internet users, many of
whom still connect through modems.”) (citing 141 Cong.Rec. S8329-46 (daily ed. June 14, 1995)
(statements of Sen. Exon and Sen. Coats)).
144
47 U.S.C. § 223a(1)(C).
145
Dalton Jr., supra note ____ (citing a spokesman from the offices of the Washington Congressman Rep.
Jim McDermott who joined in sponsoring the amendment to the Telephone Harassment Statute).
146
Tom Zeller, Jr., A Sinister Web Entraps Victims of Cyberstalkers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006. See also
Dalton Jr., supra note ____ (explaining that a Website, TheAnonymousE-mail.com, which allows users to
send anonymous messages, has filed a challenge to the amendment); K.C. Jones, Cyberstalking Law
Targets E-Mail, but Could Chill Bloggers,
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=177103642; McCullagh, supra note
____ (quoting an ACLU representative, “The use of the word ‘annoy’ is particularly problematic . . .
What’s annoying to one person may not be annoying to someone else.”).
147
United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004) remanded on other grounds in United States v.
Bowker, 125 Fed. Appx. 701 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding criminal convictions, but remanded to district
court for re-sentencing). See also United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3rd Cir. 1978) (upholding
constitutionality of the statute).
143
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or free speech.148 Although Bowker was decided prior to the amendment to § 223, the
analysis is the same. Read in context, “annoy,” like “threaten” and “harass,” is not
unconstitutional because its purpose is to prohibit messages aimed at instilling fear —
whether the message is sent via the telephone or the Internet.
This amendment to § 223 is a step in the right direction since it is evidence that
Congress has specifically recognized cyberstalking as a problem. However, even with
the amendment, § 223 is still inadequate to fully deal with cyberstalking for three
reasons. First, the identity of the person sending the message must be anonymous.149 It
seems odd to only make cyberstalking a crime where the identity of the cyberstalker is
unknown.150 This element seemingly, and without reason, carves out a number of
terrifying cases where the victim knows the identity of the cyberstalker.
Second, the statute applies only to direct communications between the stalker and
victim — e.g., the statute would only be triggered when the cyberstalker sends an e-mail
directly to the victim.151 Thus, the amended statute is inadequate to deal with behavior
where the cyberstalker indirectly harasses or terrorizes his victim by posting messages on

148

The court explained that the word “annoy” standing alone might pose vagueness concerns. But, the
“statutory language must be read in the context of Congressional intent to protect innocent individuals from
fear, abuse or annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for
other unjustifiable motives. This context suggests that the words annoy, abuse, threaten or harass should be
read together to be given similar meanings.” Bowker, 372 F.3d. at 382-83 (internal citations omitted).
Thus, “[A]ny vagueness associated with the word ‘annoy’ is mitigated by the fact that the meanings of
‘threaten’ and ‘harass’ can easily be ascertained and have generally accepted meanings.” Id. The court
went on to explain that the statute did not violate the freedom of speech because the “thrust of the statute is
to prohibit communications intended to instill fear in the victim, not to provoke a discussion about political
issues of the day.” Id. at 379.
149
42 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006). See also Jones, supra note ____ (citing Jeff Lundgren,
communications director for the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, who states that the amendment “doesn’t
target any Internet except e-mail”).
150
However, one court has held that the lack of the anonymity element made a state statute unconstitutional
under the New Hampshire State Constitution. See New Hampshire v. Brobst, 857 A.2d 1253 (N.H. 2004)
(note, this case did not deal with the constitutionality of the statute under the U.S. Constitution).
151
42 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006).
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a bulletin board, creating a Website aimed at terrorizing his victim, or encouraging third
parties to harass the victim.
Finally, the statute limits cyberstalking to the maximum punishment of two years
in prison.152 While there may be cyberstalking cases where the actions merit a sentence
of only two years, there are certainly federal statutes that make offline stalking
punishable by five years to life imprisonment.153 It is not clear why there should be such
low limits on the punishment of a crime under this statute.
Thus, the statute, even with the amendment, fails to fully combat all of the
criminal vices of cyberstalking.
3. Gaps in the Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
The most promising federal statute to combat cyberstalking, is the “Interstate
Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act.”154 The statute was passed in 1996 and was the
first federal law to deal specifically with stalking (and, at that time, specifically offline
stalking). Initially, there were three elements to the statute: (1) the defendant had to
“travel across state lines” (2) and intentionally “engage in a course of conduct” using
“mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce” (3) that placed a person in
“reasonable fear of death” or of “serious bodily injury.”155 There have been two recent
amendments to this statute that makes it applicable to some forms of cyberstalking.
The first amendment passed in 2000, changed the first element of the statute
dealing with jurisdiction. The statute was formerly only triggered when a stalker
152

42 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (2006).
See The Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A (2006); 18 U.S.C.A. §
2261(b) (2006) (setting forth the penalties for violating § 2261A).
154
18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
155
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1), (2)(A)-(B) (1996).
153
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physically traveled “across state lines,” which obviously posed a problem in
cyberstalking cases since a cyberstalker can harass his victim without even walking out
of his front door, let alone travel across state lines. However, the 2000 amendment
changed the applicability of the statute from a person who physically travels to a person
who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce.”156 While it has not been specifically
litigated whether traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of the statute
encompasses the Internet, there has been one Sixth Circuit case since the amendment
where the defendant was charged with online stalking under § 2261A; 157 however, in that
case, the defendant had traveled across state lines.158
The second amendment to § 2261A occurred recently in January 2006. 159 The
“Violence Against Women Act” (the same act that amended the Telephone Harassment
Statute) added language to both the second and third elements criminalizing a course of
conduct where the stalker “uses any interactive computer service” that causes “substantial
emotional harm.” 160 The new language of the statute has not yet been litigated, but it is
arguable that “interactive computer service” reaches cases in which cyberstalkers use the
computer to send e-mail messages (anonymous or not) or post messages on blogs or
Websites.

156

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. B, Title I, §
1107(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1498 (2000).
157
In Bowker, the defendant was charged with “Count 2 (cyberstalking),” which alleged “that between
December 25, 2000 and August 18, 2001 Bowker, located in Ohio, knowingly and repeatedly used the
Internet to engage in a course of conduct that intentionally placed Knight, then located in West Virginia, in
reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2).” United States v.
Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 377, n.2 (6th Cir. 2004) (distinguished on other grounds).
158
Id. at 374.
159
Violence Against Women Act, supra note ____.
160
Id.
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Thus, the newly amended § 2261A address many of the shortcomings of the other
federal statutes. It does not have a “true/credible threat” requirement;161 but rather adopts
a standard that measures the victim’s “reasonable fear” or “substantial emotional
harm.”162 Nor does it limit coverage of the “use” of the computer to only anonymous email messages.163
However, § 2261A still falls short of completely addressing the cyberstalking
problem. The statute does not squarely deal with situations where the cyberstalker
pretends to be the victim and encourages third parties to innocently harass the victim —
such as posting sexual invitations on a message board in the name of the victim to dupe
third parties to respond.
The bottom line is that the current federal laws are not able to deal with all the
criminal aspects of cyberstalking. But they should. Particularly because of the
jurisdictional problems that cyberstalking creates. And, the evidence to prosecute the
cyberstalkers, or even find them, may be with Internet providers in all different
jurisdictions. Better federal laws will give the federal authorities the necessary tools to
control and combat cyberstalking.
c. Potential Statutory Barriers
In addition to gaps in the state and federal laws, there may also be barriers in
combating the cyberstalking problem. In particular, the problems that plague the
codification of cyberstalking could also create significant difficulties for victims
attempting to obtain protective orders against cyberstalkers. The main reason for this
problem is that often the statutory definition of “stalking” governs the issuance of
161

18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1), (2)(A)-(B) (2006).
163
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2261(B) with 42 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2006).
162
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protective orders.164 Thus, where the language of the statute does not cover
cyberstalking, it may be difficult to obtain a protective order. Also, the application
procedure for a protective order may call for information that is difficult or impossible to
obtain due to the anonymous nature of a cyberstalker.165
In Virginia, for example, the law provides that a Stalking Protective Order may be
issued after a criminal conviction for stalking.166 Alternatively, the victim would have to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the perpetrator is guilty of stalking.167
This may pose a problem in cyberstalking cases, because it is unlikely that the Virginia
stalking statute covers cases where the cyberstalkers entice third party harassment.168 In
fact, is unclear if Virginia’s stalking statute specifically covers electronic
communications.169 Thus, cyberstalking victims may have to wait until the cyberstalker
is formally prosecuted before they can secure any sort of protective order.170

164

See generally Lowell T. Woods, Note, Anti-Stalker Legislation: A Legislative Attempt to Surmount the
Inadequacies of Protective Orders, 27 IND. L.J. 449 (1993).
165
For example, to file a Petition for Order of Protection in Indiana, the victim must know (1) the correct
name of the cyberstalker, (2) either their date or birth or their social security number, and (3) a correct,
current address. See Ind. Code Ann. § 34-26-5 (West 2006), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/forms/po/po/po0102.doc The anonymity of the Internet may make it difficult under such a statute to procure all this
detailed information; thus, a cyberstalking victim may be unable to receive any official protection from the
stalking.
166
See Domestic Violence and Family Abuse,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/jdr/Lynchburg/violence.html#ppo.
167
Id.
168
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (West 2005).
169
Id. See infra Appendix to this Article.
170
There are other examples where it would be hard for cyberstalking victims to obtain protective orders.
In Las Vegas, victims may apply for a protective order only if they are either (1) related by blood or
marriage to the stalker, (2) have been in a dating relationship with or been a roommate of the stalker, or (3)
have children with the stalker. See Las Vegas Domestic Violence Unit,
http://www.lvmpd.com/Bureaus_and_Staff/Domestic_Violence/Protective_Orders.html. Likewise in
Texas, to obtain a protective order, the victim and the offender must be (1) related by blood or marriage, (2)
living together, or previously lived together, or (3) have a child together. The protective order is defined in
terms of family violence, and makes no mention of resources for cyberstalking. See Attorney General of
Texas, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/victims/protective.shtml#law. In Maryland, victims must prove that an
act occurred that caused them to fear imminent bodily harm (e.g, a credible threat) or prove criminal
stalking to obtain a peace or protective order. See Protective Orders,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/courtforms/joint/ccdcdv01br.pdf.
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Federal stalking laws pose similar problems. In the last decade, federal
congressional bills have been introduced, but not passed, that would require protective
orders be issued upon conviction of stalking.171 The Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Act, which partially strengthened existing federal laws concerning cyberstalking, failed to
retain the requirement that protective orders be issued upon conviction. Indeed, that Act
did not address issues related to protective orders in cyberstalking cases at all.172 Thus, a
cyberstalking victim may not be able to obtain a proactive order via current federal laws.
Another potential issue concerns how a cyberstalker subscribes to the Internet.
For instance, the Federal Cable Communications Policy Act prohibits the disclosure of
cable subscriber records to law enforcement agencies without a court order and advance
notice to the subscriber.173 Potentially this means that if the perpetrator uses a cable
connection (as opposed to a dial-up connection via the telephone lines) to access the
Internet, law enforcement agents have to notify the potential cyberstalker before being
able to access computer records (e.g., evidence that would be crucial to prosecuting a
cyberstalker). Although it has not been litigated in a cyberstalking case, it seems as
though the Patriot Act would likely give the court some leeway in allowing the
government to access cable records without first notifying the cyberstalker.174

171

H.R. 3747, 105th Cong (1998); H.R. 1869, 106th Cong. (1999).
See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Div. B, Title I, §
1107(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1498 (2000).
173
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (2006).
174
See, e.g., Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001); In re Application of the United States for an
Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D) Directed to Cablevision Sys. Corp. 1111 Steward Ave. Bethpage,
N.Y. 11714, 158 F. Supp. 2d 644 (2001). In In re Application, the court ruled that the part of CCPA that
required cable operators to give advance notice to their subscribers before revealing their information to the
government was repealed by implication by the more recent Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See
In re Application, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 648; 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). Although In re Application was not a
cyberstalking case, it seems as though the same argument could be applied. Moreover, since this case, the
Patriot Act has come on the scene. Although it has not yet been litigated, the Patriot Act appears to be an
even broader abolition of the CCPA requirement. The Patriot Act specifically amended the language in
subsection (c)(2)(D) of the CCPA, which effectively allows the government to obtain information without a
172
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IV. Problems with Criminalizing Cyberstalking
There are at least two potential concerns related to criminalizing cyberstalking.
a. Constitutional Considerations
As with offline harassment laws, cyberstalking laws need to be relatively broad to
be effective. However, they cannot be so broad as to impinge upon the rights of free
speech protected under the First Amendment. Thus, any interpretation of existing
harassment laws and changes in stalking statutes should keep in mind that, as with offline
stalking, cyberstalking should generally involve conduct reasonably understood to
constitute harassing and threatening behavior.175
Court rulings regarding the constitutionality of telephone harassment laws give
guidance. Constitutional concerns are not implicated when statutes prohibit the matter
and means of the telephone call and have an element of specific intent to harass the
person called. Thus, telephone harassment statutes that have a specific intent element are
constitutional when they prohibit repeated, anonymous, or late-night calls.176 Likewise,
statutes related to cyberstalking should focus on specific intent, conduct-based behavior
such as repeated transmission of e-mails (e-mail “letter bombs”) or use of lewd language
with the intent to harass.177

court order. See Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 211; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 119, 121, 206 (2006)
(These chapters include all sections of the code for Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and
Interception of Oral Communications; Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access; and Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices). Therefore, the Patriot Act has given the
government more leeway in obtaining subscriber information from cable providers by getting rid of the
court order, and In re Application might allow for this information to be gathered without notification to the
subscriber even if a court order is sought.
175

See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that the Internet is an
important tool for protected speech activities); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
176
Lisa A. Karczewski, Stalking in Cyberspace: The Expansion of California’s Current Anti-Stalking Laws
in the Age of the Internet, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 517 (1999).
177
Karczewski, supra note ____, at 517.
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Thus, as long as statutes aimed at cyberstalking contain the following two
elements, it will probably not be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad: (1) “willfully”
harasses, follows, engages in conduct, etc. ensures that the perpetrator has the requisite
specific intent to commit a crime, and (2) an provision stating that the law does not
include “constitutionally protected activity”, including, but not limited to “picketing and
organized protests.”178 Moreover, many current offline stalking statutes contain specific
language that the statute cannot violate constitutional rights. 179 This may be another
element that should be included in newly enacted cyberstalking statutes.
b. Lack of Cyberstalking Data
Second, evidence of whether cyberstalking is indeed becoming a societal problem
is largely anecdotal and informal. In fact, law enforcement agencies from different
jurisdictions report widely different statistics on stalking via the Internet. However, those
jurisdictions that have computer crime departments tend to report a larger number of
cyberstalking incidents.180 The lack of data is partly because many cyberstalking victims
do not report the conduct to law enforcement, and partly because law enforcement
agencies have not had adequate training in how to deal with it.181 However, there are
some reports that suggest that cyberstalking is ever growing. The CyberAngels, a non-

178

Tucker, supra note ____, at 622, 630-31.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-92 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7906(2)(a) (2005); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-45-10-1 (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.130(1)(b)(2) (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 210-A(2)(A) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West
2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-311.02(1) (2005); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.575(6)(e) (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a(II)(a) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-3A-4 (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a), (5) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
163.755 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2004) (cyberstalking statute); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
22-19A-5 (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-9a(h) (LexisNexis 2005).
180
1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note ____, at 12.
181
Id..
179
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profit organization that assists cyberstalking victims,182 estimates that there are
approximately 63,000 Internet stalkers in the United States and 474,000 victims worldwide.183
V. CONCLUSION
As technology changes, so do the laws. For example, with the increased and daily
use of cars, the laws had to change to make driving under the influence of alcohol a
crime. Similarly, the stalking and harassment laws should be reviewed to ensure that
they are adequate to address the new crime of cyberstalking.
Cyberstalking is a crime with issues that are distinct from offline stalking such that
current state and federal laws are inadequate to deal with all aspects of cyberstalking.
Thus, cyberstalking laws should be enacted that have the reasonable person standard and
also explicitly deal with situations where the cyberstalker dupes “innocent” third parties
to do the stalking.
Clear federal and state laws which specifically prohibit cyberstalking may address
this problem. If victims knew of the laws, they might be more encouraged to report
incidents. And, if cyberstalkers knew of the laws, they might be less likely to stalk
victims online. Moreover, clear cyberstalking laws would give guidance to law
enforcement agencies on how to appropriately respond to reported incidents.

APPENDIX (starts on next page)

182
183

The CyberAngels Website is at www.cyberangels.org.
Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note ____, at 2.
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APPENDIX: STATE STATUTES
Code
Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?

Alabama
ALA. CODE § 13A-118(b)(1) (2005).

Alabama
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90
(2005).

Alaska
ALASKA STAT. §§
11.41.260 to 41.270
(2004).
1st Degree Stalking
2nd Degree Stalking

Alaska
ALASKA STAT. §
11.61.120(a)(4) (2004).

Arizona
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2921 (2005).

Harassing
Communications
(misdemeanor)
Yes, but requires a
“threat”

Stalking
(felony)

Harassment

Harassment

Yes, but requires a
“credible threat.” See
ALA. CODE § 13A-692(b) (2005).

No

No

Yes
“Conduct directed at a
specific person which
would cause a
reasonable person to be
seriously alarmed,
annoyed or harassed and
the conduct in fact
seriously alarms, annoys
or harasses the person.”
No

Credible Threat
Standard?

Requires a “threat”

Yes

No

Yes, requires a “threat”
of physical injury or
sexual contact

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?

No

No

No

No

No

Yes
“Communicates with a
person, anonymously or
otherwise, by telephone,
mail, or any other form
of written or electronic
communication”

No

Yes, but only covers
“electronic
communications” to
victim. See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 11.41.260 to
41.270(3)(f) (2004).

Yes, but only to
“electronic
communications” to
victim

Yes

1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May only apply to email sent directly to the
victim, not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May only apply to email sent directly to the
victim, not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems in
prosecuting
cyberstalking
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Code

Arizona
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-2923 (2005).

Arkansas
ARK. CODE ANN. § 571-229 (West 2005).

Title

Stalking

Stalking
(felony)

Reasonable Person
Standard?

Yes, but only when the
conduct includes repeatedly
maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to a
person, otherwise a threat is
required.
Sometimes
Conduct includes
repeatedly maintaining a
visual or physical proximity
to a person conveying
verbal or written threats or
threats implied by conduct.

Credible Threat
Standard?

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems

No

Arkansas
ARK. CODE ANN. § 571-209(a)(1) (West
2005).
Harassing
Communications
(misdemeanor)
No

Arkansas
ARK. CODE ANN. § 541-108(a)(1)(A)-(D)
(West 2005).
Unlawful Computerized
Communications
(misdemeanor)
No

Yes
“Terrorist threat”

No, requires intent to
annoy

Sometimes
“Message threatens to
cause injury to any
person or damage to any
property of any person
or uses obscene, lewd,
or profane language”

No

No

No

No

Yes
“Verbal or written threat
including electronic
statements and conduct,
combined with a pattern
of conduct intending to
cause fear, and made
with the apparent ability
to carry out the threat as
to cause the target to
reasonably fear for her
safety or her family’s
safety”
No

Not specifically, but does
cover “written threats.”

Not specifically

Not specifically, but
does apply to any “form
of written
communication” to the
victim.

Yes, but only applies to
“computerized
communications” sent
to the victim

Yes
Includes computers
defined by 18 U.S.C. §
2510(12) (2006).

1. Requires a threat.
2. May not cover
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May only apply to
messages sent directly
to the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May only apply to
messages sent directly
to the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. Requires a credible
threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Requires an actual threat
when the perpetrator is not
physical pursuit.
1. Requires an actual threat
when the perpetrator is not
physically pursuing the
victim.
2. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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CAL. PENAL CODE §
646.9 (West 2005).
Stalking
Yes, but also requires a
credible threat
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Code
Title

Reasonable Person
Standard?
Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?

California
CAL. PENAL CODE §
653m (West 2005).
Telephone Calls or
Contact by Electronic
Communication
Device with Intent to
Annoy
(misdemeanor)
No
No, requires intent to
annoy
No
Yes, but only applies
to “contact” with the
victim

Notes

Potential Statutory
Problems

1 Reasonable
standard would be
more applicable.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

Colorado
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-9-111(1)(e) (West
2005).
Harassment — Stalking

Yes (Stalking)
No (Harassment)
Yes (Stalking)
No (Harassment)
No
Possibly (Stalking)
Yes (Harassment)
Computer, computer
network, or computer
system
The statute specifically
notes seriousness of
stalking. See § 18-9111(4)(a).

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.

Colorado
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1813-105 (West 2005).
Criminal Libel
(felony)

Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-181c (West
2005).
1st Deg. Stalking
(felony)

Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-181d (West
2005).
2nd Deg. Stalking
(misdemeanor)

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes
“follows or lies in wait”
No

Yes
“follows or lies in wait”
No

1. Electronic
communications are not
specifically covered.
2. Requires physical
pursuit, which would
not include many
aspects of cyberstalking.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. Electronic
communications are not
covered.
2. Requires physical
pursuit, which would
not include many
aspects of cyberstalking.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Not specifically, but applies to
“written instrument”

Standard: “A person who shall
knowingly publish or
disseminate, either by written
instrument, sign, pictures, or
the like, any statement or
object tending…to impeach the
honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation. . .of one who is
alive, and thereby to expose
him to public hatred, contempt,
or ridicule, commits criminal
libel.”
1. This is not a stalking
statute, but might be
interpreted to cover “innocent”
third party harassment, if
“public hatred” includes the
Internet.
2. Electronic communications
are not specifically covered.
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Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-181e (West
2005).
3rd Deg. Stalking
(misdemeanor)
Yes

Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-182b
(West 2005).
1st Deg. Harassment
(felony)
No

Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-183
(West 2005).
2nd Deg. Harassment
(misdemeanor)
No

Credible Threat
Standard?

No

No

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?

Yes
“follows or lies in wait”
No

Yes
“he threatens to kill
or physically injure”
No

Code
Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?

Yes
Covers “computer
network”

Yes

Delaware
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§
1311-12 (2005).

Stalking
(felony or misdemeanor)
Sometimes
Only when the conduct
includes repeatedly
maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to a
person, otherwise a threat is
required
Sometimes
Either physical proximity or
threat
Sometimes
Either proximity or a threat
No

Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Yes
2004 amendment added the
phrase, “or cause a
reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional
distress”

Broad statute
covering
communications
made “in a manner
likely to
cause annoyance or
alarm.”

Notes

Potential Statutory
Problems

No

Delaware
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
1312A (2005).

1. Electronic
communications are not
explicitly covered.
2. Requires physical
pursuit, which would
not include many
aspects of
cyberstalking.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.

1. Requires direct
contact with the
victim.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May only apply to
messages sent
directly to the victim
(e-mail), not other
Internet postings.
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1. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. Requires a threat when
the perpetrator is not
physically pursuing the
victim.
3. May only apply to
messages sent directly to the
victim (e-mail), not other
Internet postings.

No
No
Yes
Communicate with a person
by electronic communication
in a manner which the person
knows is likely to cause
annoyance or alarm
For a misdemeanor charge,
the statute is broad covering
any “course of alarming or
distressing conduct which
serves no legitimate
purpose;” the language is
narrower for a felony charge.
Compare § 1311 with § 1312.
1. For a felony charge, it
may not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. For a felony charge, it
may only apply to messages
sent directly to the victim (email), not other Internet
postings.
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Code
Title

Reasonable
Person
Standard?
Credible
Threat
Standard?
Requires
Actual Physical
Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes

Potential
Statutory
Problems

District of
Columbia
D.C. CODE § 22404 (2005).
Assault or
Threatened Assault
in a Menacing
Manner —
Stalking
Yes

Florida

Florida

Georgia

Georgia

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West
2005).
Stalking

FLA. STAT. ANN. §
836.10 (West 2005).
Harassment

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-590 (West 2005).
Stalking
(misdemeanor)

GA. CODE ANN. § 165-91 (West 2005).
Aggravated Stalking
(felony)

Yes
But, for a felony charge requires a
credible threat.

No

No

No

No - misdemeanor stalking
Yes - felony stalking

Yes

Yes
Conduct that
“harass[es] or
intimidat[es].” § 16-590(a).
No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Unclear, does not
specify how the
communication
must be made

Yes

Not specifically, but
does cover “inscribed
communication”

Yes

Yes

1. Unclear if
electronic
communications
are covered.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.

Section 784.048(1)(d) specifically
includes cyberstalking (amended 2003)
§- "’Cyberstalk’ means to engage in a
course of conduct to communicate, or
to cause to be communicated, words,
images, or language by or through the
use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at a specific
person, causing substantial emotional
distress to that person and serving no
legitimate purpose.”
Florida has a model statute that seems
to cover most aspects of cyberstalking;
unclear if “directed at a specific
person” limits the statute’s reach to
communications sent directly to the
victim.

Computer and computer
network defined by GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-9-92
(West 2005) (added
2000); contact occurs at
the place or places
where the
communication is
received
1. Unclear if electronic
communications are
covered.
2. Requires a credible
threat.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
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1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.

1. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
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Code

Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?

Hawaii
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
711-1106.4 to -1106.5
(LexisNexis 2005).

Hawaii
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 711-1106 (LexisNexis
2005).

Idaho
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 187905 to -7906 (2005).

Illinois
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West
2005).

Illinois
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
135/1-2 (West 2005).

Harassment by Stalking
Aggravated Harassment by
Stalking
No

Harassment

1st Deg. Stalking
2nd Deg. Stalking

Cyberstalking
(felony)

Harassment Through
Electronic Communications

Yes

Yes

Yes (either reasonable
person or credible
threat)

No, but has broad standard
that covers the intent “to
harass”

Yes (either reasonable
person or credible
threat)
No

Yes (either intent to harass
or direct threat)

Credible Threat
Standard?

No

Not specifically, but see
“Notes”

No

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?

Sometimes
Either pursuit, or nonconsensual contact —
Yes
Non-consensual contact
includes contact via e-mail
transmission; amended in
2003
Aggravated harassment by
stalking requires a current
and prior conviction for the
offense of harassment by
stalking

No

No

Yes
Repeatedly makes email transmissions
without legitimate
purpose
Must prove the victim
reasonably believed that
defendant intended to
cause bodily injury. See
State v. Bush, 50 P.3d
428 (Haw. Ct. App.
2002).

Yes
Nonconsensual conduct
includes but is not limited
to sending electronic
communications
Course of conduct
involved “nonconsensual
contact.” IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-7906(2)(a)
(2005).

1. May require threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not other
Internet postings.

Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes

Potential Statutory
Problems

1. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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No

Yes

Yes
Same as 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West
2005).

May apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass since statute is
broadly written to
include a “course of
conduct” “that alarms,
torments, or terrorizes
that person.” § 5/127.5(b).
Illinois has a model
statute that seems to
cover most aspects of
cyberstalking.

Statute prohibits knowingly
inducing a person to
transmit a harassing
message to a person under
13. See § 135/1-2(3.1).
Note this requires direct
communication with the
victim.
Illinois has a model statute
that seems to cover most
aspects of cyberstalking,
including e-mail bombs.
See § 135/1-2(3).
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Code
Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?

Indiana
IND. CODE ANN. § 3545-10-1, -5 (West
2005).
Stalking
(felony)
Yes

Indiana
IND. CODE ANN. § 3545-2-2 (West 2005).

Iowa
IOWA CODE ANN. §
708.7 (West 2005).

Iowa
IOWA CODE ANN. §
708.11 (West 2005).

Kansas
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 213438 (West 2005).

Harassment
(misdemeanor)
No, but has broad
standard that covers the
intent “to harass”
No

Harassment

Stalking

Stalking

No, but has broad
standard that covers the
intent “to harass”
Yes, for first and second
degree harassment
No, for third degree
harassment
No

Yes, but requires a
threat. See §
708.11(1)(b), 2(a).
Yes, either visual
proximity or threat

No

Yes, either visual
proximity or threat
Not specifically

No

Credible Threat
Standard?

Yes, for a felony. See
IND. CODE ANN. § 3545-10-5(b)(1)(B).

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?

No

No

Yes

Yes
Computer network is
defined in IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-43-2-3(a)
(West 2005).

Notes

Potential Statutory
Problems

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. Requires a threat for
conduct to be a felony.

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
§ 35-45-2-2(a)(4)(A)(B).

Yes

Sometimes requires
personal contact — an
encounter where two or
more people are in
visual or physical
proximity to each other;
personal contact does
not require a physical
touching or
communication
1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
2. May only apply to
direct communication
with the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings. § 708.7
1(a)(1).
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1. Requires a threat.
2. May not cover
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Yes

Yes
Electronic
communication
includes, but is not
limited to, computers
and computer networks

1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Reasonable Person
Standard?

Yes, but also
requires an explicit
threat

Credible Threat
Standard?

Yes

Kentucky
KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 525.080
(West 2005).
Harassing
Communications
(misdemeanor)
No, but has broad
standard that covers
the intent “to
harass”
No

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Unclear

Yes

Yes

Yes
E-mail means
transmission by
computer or other
electronic means
received by a person
with a unique
address

1. Requires a threat.
2. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (email), not other
Internet postings.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. Only applies to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

Code
Title

Kentucky
KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 508.130.150 (West 2005).
1st Deg. Stalking
2nd Deg. Stalking

Louisiana
LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:40.2
(2005).
Stalking

Louisiana
LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:40.3
(2005).
Cyberstalking

Maine
ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, §§
210-210-A (2005).
Terrorizing (§ 210)
Stalking (§ 210A)

Maryland
MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-805
(West 2005).
Misuse of
Electronic Mail

Yes

Yes, but requires
threat.

No

No

No, but has broad
standard that covers
the intent “to
harass”
No

Yes
Conduct requires
either visual
proximity or a threat

No

Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems

1. Requires a threat.
2. May not cover
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (email), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May not cover
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
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Similar to North
Carolina’s
cyberstalking statute
Louisiana has a
model statute, but it
is not explicitly
clear whether it
applies when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.
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Maryland
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 3-802 (West
2005)
Stalking

Maryland
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 3-803 (West
2005).
Harassment
(misdemeanor)

Massachusetts
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 265, § 43 (West
2005).
Stalking

Massachusetts
MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 265, § 43A
(West 2005).
Criminal Harassment

Reasonable Person
Standard?

Yes

Yes, but requires a
threat

Yes

Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?

No

No, but has broad
standard that covers the
intent “to harass”
No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Unclear

Yes

Yes

Yes
Non-consensual conduct
includes sending mail or
electronic communications

1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May only apply to direct
“contact” with the victim
(e-mail), not other Internet
postings. § 750.411h(1)(c).
2. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Code
Title

Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?

Yes
Approaching or
pursuing another
No

Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems

1. Electronic
communications are not
explicitly covered.
2. Requires physical
pursuit, which would
not include many
aspects of cyberstalking.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Requires that stalker be
warned/asked to stop
conduct
1. Electronic
communications are not
explicitly covered.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Michigan
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.411h-i (West 2005).
Stalking (misdemeanor)
Aggravated Stalking
(felony)
Yes (Stalking)
No (Aggravated Stalking)
No (Stalking)
Yes (Aggravated Stalking)
No
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Code

Minnesota
MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.749 (West 2005).

Mississippi
MISS. CODE ANN. § 973-107 (West 2005).

Title

Harassment — Stalking

Stalking

Reasonable
Person
Standard?

Yes
Actor knows or has
reason to know it would
cause victim under the
circumstances to feel
fear, and actually
causes fear
No

Sometimes
(see “credible threat”)

Credible
Threat
Standard?

Requires
Actual Physical
Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Potential
Statutory
Problems

Mississippi
MISS. CODE ANN. §§
97-3-85, 97-29-45
(West 2005).
Threats; obscene
communications
No, but has broad
standard that covers
the intent “to
terrorize” or “to
harass”

Mississippi
MISS. CODE ANN. §
97-45-15 (West
2005).
Cyberstalking
(felony)
No, but has broad
standard that
covers the intent
“to harass”

Sometimes
Any person who
willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows
or harasses another
person, or makes a
credible threat, with the
intent to place that
person in reasonable
fear of death or injury

No

No

No

No

Sometimes
Requires language
threatening to
inflict injury or for
extortion; to
knowingly make
false statements
intending to
threaten, terrify, or
harass; larger
penalty if there is a
credible threat
No

Yes

Unclear

Yes

1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.

1. Electronic
communications are not
explicitly covered.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.

1. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
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Yes
Electronic
communication has
to be received by a
person with a
unique address
1. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (email), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.

Missouri
MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.225 (West
2005).
Stalking

Montana
MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-5-220 (2005).
Stalking

Yes, for stalking

Yes

Yes, plus
credible threat
for aggravated
stalking
Yes, for
aggravated
stalking

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

1. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker
dupes an
“innocent” third
party to harass.

1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.
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Code
Title
Reasonable
Person
Standard?

Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?

Montana
MONT. CODE ANN. § 458-213 (2005).
Privacy in
Communications
No

Sometimes
use of obscene or lewd
language or a threat
No

Nebraska
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28-311.02-03
(2005).
Stalking

Nevada
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.575 (West 2005).

Nevada
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.571 (West 2005).

New Hampshire
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
633:3-a (2005).

Stalking

Harassment

Stalking

No, but has broad
standard that covers
conduct that “seriously
terrifies, threatens, or
intimidates.” § 28311.02(2)(a).
No

Yes (Stalking,
misdemeanor)

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.

1. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
[Note, N.H. harassment
statute held
unconstitutional. State v.
Pierce, 887 A.2d 132
(N.H. 2005) (finding N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4
(2005), unconstitutional).

No

Yes

Unclear

1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.

Notes

Potential
Statutory
Problems

No (Aggravated Stalking,
felony)
No (Stalking)
Yes (Aggravated
Stalking)
No
Yes
“Person who commits
stalking using Internet . . .
to publish, display, or
distribute information in a
manner that substantially
increases the risk of harm
or violence to the victim.”
§ 200.575(3)
This statute may apply
cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass and would make it
a felony charge. See §
200.575(3)
Although “cyberstalking”
is not specifically
mentioned, this statute
may apply to most aspects
of cyberstalking.
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Code
Title

New Jersey
N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:12-10 (West
2005).
Stalking

Reasonable Person
Standard?

No

Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?

Yes

Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems

Sometimes
Either maintain
physical proximity or
threaten
Not specifically

1. Requires a threat
or physical
proximity.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
4. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

New Jersey
N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:33-4 (West 2005).

New Mexico
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30-3A-3 (West
2005).
Stalking

Harassment
(misdemeanor)
No, but has broad
standard that covers
conduct that “causes
annoyance”
No

Yes

New Mexico
N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-3A-2 (West
2005).
Harassment
(misdemeanor)
Yes

No

No

No

New York
N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.30 (McKinney
2005).
Aggravated
Harassment
No, but has broad
standard that covers
conduct with the
intent “to harass”
No

No

No

No

No

No

Not specifically

Not specifically

Not specifically

Not specifically

Yes

1. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May not apply
to electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.

1. May not apply
to electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent”
third party to
harass.

1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
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New York
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
240.25-26
(McKinney 2005).
Harassment
Yes

Naomi Goodno
Cyberstalking

New York
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
120.45-50 (McKinney
2005).
4th & 3rd Deg. Stalking
(misdemeanors)
Yes

New York
N.Y. PENAL LAW §
120.55 (McKinney
2005).
2rd Deg. Stalking
(felony)
Yes

New York
N.Y. PENAL LAW §
120.60 (McKinney
2005).
1st Deg. Stalking
(felony)
Yes

Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?

No

No

No

No

No

Yes, must display a
weapon

Yes, must cause
physical injury

Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes

Likely

No

No

Sometimes
Either harasses or
physically follows
Yes

Potential Statutory
Problems

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Code
Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?

1. Requires physical
display of weapon.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. Requires physical
display of weapon.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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North Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
14-277.3 (West 2005).

North Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
14-196.3 (West 2005).

Stalking

Cyberstalking

Yes

No, but has broad
standard that covers the
intent “to harass”
No

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

No
Yes
Similar to Louisiana’s
cyberstalking statute
North Carolina has a
model statute, but it is
not explicitly clear
whether it applies when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Code
Title

North Dakota
N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-17-07.1
(2005).
Stalking

North Dakota
N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-17-07 (2005).

Ohio
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2903.211 (West 2005).

Harassment

Menacing by Stalking
Similar standard (conduct
that would “cause another
person to believe that the
offender will cause physical
harm”). § 2903.211(A)(1).
Yes, for 4th Deg. Stalking
(felony), a threat is required.
§ 2903.211(A)(2)(b).

Ohio
OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2917.21
(West 2005).
Telecommunications
Harassment

Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 1172-73
(West 2005).
Harassment
Stalking

Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1953(8)(9) (West 2005).
Computer Crimes
Act
(misdemeanor)
No, but uses broad
standard that
covers the intent
“to harass”

No, but uses broad
standard that covers
the intent “to harass”

Yes

No

No

No

Reasonable
Person
Standard?

Yes

Credible
Threat
Standard?

No

No, uses broad
standard that
covers the intent
“to harass,” but
requires a threat
Yes

Requires
Actual Physical
Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Potential
Statutory
Problems

No

No

No

No

No

No

Not specifically

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1. May not apply
to electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.

1. Requires threat.
2. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (email), not other
Internet postings.
3. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.

Although not explicitly
entitled a cyberstalking
statute, Ohio has a model
statute, particularly because
it is one of the few that
explicitly addresses
“innocent” third party
harassers. § 2903.211(A)(2)
(“No person, through the
use of any electronic
method of remotely
transferring information,
including, but not limited to,
any computer, computer
network, computer program,
or computer system, shall
post a message with purpose
to urge or incite another to
commit a violation of
division (A)(1) of this
section.”) (emphasis added).

Yes
See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2913.01
(West 2005).
1. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.

1. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent”
third party to
harass.
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Oregon
OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.732 (West
2003).

Oregon
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
166.065(1)(c) (West
2003).

Title

Stalking

Harassment

Reasonable
Person
Standard?
Credible
Threat
Standard?

Yes, but requires
direct contact

No

Pennsylvania
18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2709 to
2709.1 (West
2005).
Stalking
Harassing
Yes

Yes
statutory provisions
make it clear that
threat or its
equivalent must have
been made for crime
of stalking to be
found. See State v.
Shields, 56 P.3d 937
(Or. Ct. App. 2002);
State v. Rangel, 934
P.2d 1128 (Or. Ct.
App. 1997).
No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes. See OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. §
163.730 (West 2003).

Yes

Yes

1. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. Requires threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.

1. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (email), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to
harass.

Code

Requires
Actual Physical
Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Potential
Statutory
Problems
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Rhode Island
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
11-59-1 and 2
(2004).

Rhode Island
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2
(2004).

South Carolina
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-1700
(2005).

Stalking

Cyberstalking

No, but has broad
harassment
standard
No

Yes

Harassment
Stalking
Yes

No

No

Yes, physical
following when
reasonable person
standard is used. §
11-59-2(a)(2).
Not specifically

No

No

Yes

Yes, for 2nd
Deg. Harassment
(misdemeanor)

1. May not apply
when a
cyberstalker dupes
an “innocent” third
party to harass.

Rhode Island has a model
statute, particularly because it is
one of the few that explicitly
addresses “innocent” third party
harassers. See § 11-52-4.2(a)
(“Whoever transmits any
communication by computer to
any person or causes any person
to be contacted for the sole
purpose of harassing that person
or his or her family is
guilty…”)(emphasis added).

1. May not
apply when a
cyberstalker
dupes an
“innocent” third
party to harass
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Code
Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?

South Dakota
S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-19A-1
(2005).
Stalking
Yes, but requires
threat; also has
broad harassment
standard
Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)

Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-17-315 (West
2005).
Stalking
Yes, but requires
contact

Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-17-308 (West
2005).
Harassment
No

Texas
TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.072
(Vernon 2005).
Stalking
Yes

Texas
TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.07
(Vernon 2005).
Harassment
No

Utah
UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-106 (West
2005).
Harassment
No

No (Stalking)
Yes (Aggravated
Stalking)

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes
Non-consensual
contact includes
sending electronic
communications

Yes

Not specifically

Not specifically

1. May require
threat.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (email), not other
Internet postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. Requires threat.
2. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (email), not other
Internet postings.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

Yes
Electronic
communication
includes a
communication
initiated by e-mail
or instant message
Statute requires
either an obscene
proposal or threat
1. Requires obscene
proposal or threat.
2. May only apply
to direct contact
with the victim (email), not other
Internet postings.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems
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1. Requires a threat.
2. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.
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Utah
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201
(West 2005).

Vermont
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 1061 (2005).

Vermont
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1027 (2005).

Virginia
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1
(West 2005).

Title

Utah
UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-106.5 (West
2005).
Stalking

Electronic Communication
Harassment

Stalking

Harassment by Computer
(misdemeanor)

Reasonable Person
Standard?

Yes, but requires a
threat

Yes

Credible Threat
Standard?

Yes
visual or physical
proximity to a
person, or threats
Either physical
pursuit or a threat
Not specifically

No, but has standard where
stalker insults, taunts, or
challenges the recipient in a
manner likely to provoke a
violent or disorderly response
Yes (one option; see “reasonable
person standard”)

Disturbing Peace by
Use of Electronic
Communication
(misdemeanor)
No

No

Yes

Yes (one option; see “reasonable
person standard”)

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

May address e-mail
bombs. See § 131027(a)(iii)

May cover “innocent” third
party harassers. “use [of] a
computer…to communicate
obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd,
lascivious, or indecent language,
or make any suggestion or
proposal of an obscene nature.”
§ 18.2-152.7:1.
If “innocent” third party
harassers are covered by this
statute, then it may cover most
aspects of cyberstalking;
however, it is written so broadly
that it may create constitutional
issues.

Code

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes

Potential Statutory
Problems

Also prevents conduct that
causes disruption, jamming, or
overload of an electronic
communication system through
excessive message traffic of
other means utilizing
communication device.
1. May require a
threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with
the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
3. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. There are potential
constitutional issues with this
statute. See, e.g., Provo City
Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735
(Utah 2004).
2. May only apply to direct
contact with the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when a
cyberstalker dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet
postings.
2. May not apply
when a cyberstalker
dupes an “innocent”
third party to harass.

- 58 -

1. May require
obscene proposal or
threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party
to harass.

No, but broad harassment
standard
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Code

Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes

Potential Statutory
Problems

Virginia
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.260.3 (West 2005).

Washington
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.61.260 (West
2005).

Stalking
Yes

Cyberstalking
No, but has broad
harassment standard
Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)

No

Washington
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.46.110 (West
2005), amended by 2006
Wash. Legis. Serv. Page
no. 2 (West).
Stalking
Yes

Washington
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.46.020 (West
2005).

Washington
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.61.230 (West
2005).

Harassment
No

No

Yes

Telephone Harassment
No, but has broad
harassment standard
Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)

No

No

No

No

No

Not specifically

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. Statute has been held
unconstitutional. See
State v. Williams, 26
P.3d 890 (Wash. 2001).
2. Requires threat.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. Does not apply to
electronic
communications
(limited only to
telephone
communications).

May cover e-mail
bombs. See §
9.61.260(1)(b).

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Washington has a
model statute,
particularly because it is
one of the few that
explicitly addresses
“innocent” third party
harassers. See §
9.61.260(1)(a) (“A
person is guilty of
cyberstalking if he or
she. . . makes an
electronic
communication to such
other person or a third
party…Using any lewd,
lascivious, indecent, or
obscene words, images,
or language, or
suggesting the
commission of any lewd
or lascivious act.”)
(emphasis added).
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West Virginia
W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-2-9a (LexisNexis
2005).
Stalking
Harassment

West Virginia
W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-3C-14a (LexisNexis
2005).
Threatening
Communications by
Computer

Reasonable Person
Standard?

Yes
See § 61-2-9a(g)(1)

Credible Threat
Standard?

Yes (one option; see
“physical pursuit”)

No, uses broad
harassment standard,
but requires cyberstalker
to contact victim
Yes (one option)

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?

Sometimes
Requires following
unless there is repeated
harassing or credible
threats
Not specifically

Code
Title

Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems

1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

Wisconsin
WIS. STAT. ANN. §
940.32 (West 2005).

Wisconsin
WIS. STAT. ANN. §
947.013 (West 2005).

Wisconsin
WIS. STAT. ANN. §
947.0125 (West 2005).

Stalking

Harassment

Yes, but requires direct
contact with victim

No, but uses broad
harassment standard

Unlawful use of
computerized
communication systems
(misdemeanor)
No, but uses broad
harassment standard

No

Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)

Yes (one option; see
“reasonable person
standard”)

No

No

No

No

Yes

Not specifically, but
course of conduct
includes sending
material by any means
to the victim

Not specifically

Yes

1. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May not apply to
electronic
communications.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May only apply to
messages sent directly
to the victim (e-mail),
not other Internet
postings.
2. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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Code
Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?

Wyoming
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2506 (2005).
Stalking
Yes, but may require a
threat. See § 6-2506(a)(ii).

Credible Threat
Standard?

Yes. See § 6-2506(a)(ii).

Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems

No
Yes

1. May require a threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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APPENDIX: FEDERAL CODES

Code
Title
Reasonable Person
Standard?
Credible Threat
Standard?
Requires Actual
Physical Pursuit?
Statute Covers
Electronic
Communications?
Notes
Potential Statutory
Problems

FEDERAL CODE
18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
(2006)
Interstate
Communications Act
No

FEDERAL CODE
47 U.S.C. § 223
Federal Telephone
Harassment Statute

FEDERAL CODE
18 U.S.C. § 2261A
(2006)
Federal Interstate
Stalking Punishment
and Prevention Act
Yes

Yes

No, but has broad
harassment standard
No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

1. Requires a threat.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. Requires messages to
be anonymously sent.
2. May only apply to
direct contact with the
victim (e-mail), not
other Internet postings.
3. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.

1. May not apply when
a cyberstalker dupes an
“innocent” third party to
harass.
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